Abstract. According to international law, anonymity of the voter is a fundamental precondition for democratic elections. In electronic voting, several aspects of voter anonymity have been identified. In this paper, we re-examine anonymity with respect to voting, and generalise existing notions of anonymity in e-voting. First, we identify and categorise the types of attack that can be a threat to anonymity of the voter, including different types of vote buying and coercion. This analysis leads to a categorisation of anonymity in voting in terms of a) the strength of the anonymity achieved and b) the extent of interaction between voter and attacker. Some of the combinations, including weak and strong receiptfreeness, are formalised in epistemic logic.
Introduction
In the field of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, much effort has been put into formalizing the concept of anonymity of messages (e.g. [14] ). Intuitively, anonymity means that it is impossible to determine who sent which message to whom. Depending on the context, different formalizations of the notion of anonymity seem to be necessary [7] .
The concept of anonymity is also of importance in electronic voting -often, voters should have the ability to vote without anybody else knowing which option they voted for (although in some countries, such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand, this is ultimately not the case). In the electronic voting community, the property expressing precisely that is usually called "privacy" instead of anonymity [6] . In voting, however, enabling privacy is not sufficient, as this does not prevent vote buying. To prevent vote buying, an election needs to require privacy -no voter should be able to convince any other party of how she voted.
The concept of receipt-freeness expresses that a voter cannot convince any other party of how she voted by creating a receipt. The notion has been introduced by [2], after which various receipt-free voting protocols were proposed, such as [9, 17] . Delaune et al. alternate definition that allows identification of receipts. Juels et al. note in [11] that receipt-freeness is not sufficient to prevent coercion in electronic elections, and they introduced the notion of coercion-resistance. This broader notion is again formalized by Delaune et al. in [6] .
Given the differences in approaches and in notions, the question arises whether these notions capture the specific needs for anonymity in voting. The three main levels of anonymity that have been identified in voting, capture progressively more strict notions of anonymity. The notion of receipt-freeness was motivated as necessary to provide secret-ballot elections. If receipts can be obtained, using a voting booth makes no difference to the secrecy: Votes can be bought, and voters can be coerced.
To address the question of whether or not the notion of receipt-freeness is sufficient, we reexamine voter influencing, focusing on vote buying. What is vote buying, when can an action be called vote buying and when is it an election promise? As this is, ultimately, a subjective issue, the goal is not to provide a yes-or-no test. Instead, we aim to arrive at a charactarisation of vote buying / election promises, which will enable election officials to decide which practices are allowed and which should be abolished. Based on these findings, we then reexamine the concept of receipt-freeness and adapt it to encompass uncovered issues.
Related Work
Distinctions between vote buying and election promises have been investigated by economists, philosophers and political scientists before.
Van Acker [1] discusses the relation between the notions of coercion, forced abstention, randomisation and simulation. However, he includes vote buying in the concept of coercion. Kochin and Kochin [12] discuss the issue of giving benefits to individual voters versus giving benefits to identifiable groups. They also consider the difference between benefits offered through the normal processes of government (related to being elected) versus benefits offered through private arrangements. Thirdly, they mention that trading votes for or against proposals between parties or members in parliament is acceptable.
The latter practice is also mentioned by Hasen [8] and called "legislative logrolling". Hasen further differentiates the issues of corporate vote buying, payments to increase turnout, campaign promises and campaign contributions, and vote buying in so-called "special district" 1 elections. Schaffer [18] distinguishes between instrumental, normative and coercive compliance in relation to vote buying. Instrumental compliance covers tangible benefits in exchange for votes, normative compliance means voting based on a feeling of obligation, and coercive compliance denotes voting based on threats. Schaffer also mentions the possibility that money is offered for not changing voting behaviour. In order to check compliance, a buyer may monitor the individual vote,
